PROPOSALS FOR COORDINATION of monetary policy to stabilize nominal or real exchange rates or for targeting monetary policy on the nominal exchange rate assume, explicitly or implicitly, that exchange rate fluctuations are, on balance, harmful to the world economy and that monetary policy can productively reduce the amplitude of these fluctuations. The objective of this paper is to examine the analytical basis and empirical evidence for these assumptions. The conclusion is that both hold only some of the time. A coordination agreement would therefore have to define the circumstances under which the assumptions hold, a difficult task indeed. A third assumption in current proposals for a formal international conference to implement a coordination agreement-a " new Bretton Woods '-is that such an agreement is at least politically feasible. This assumption too is questionable. Toward the end of the paper I will argue that any international conference held now would resemble the failed World Economic Conference of 1933 far more closely than it would Bretton Woods.
The point of the evidence in figure 1 is that movements in the nominal exchange rate may have been reactions to equilibrium adjustments in real rates. In this case, a monetary intervention that attempted to stabilize the nominal rate would frustrate the movement of the real rate in the short run and shift the adjustment to relative prices in the longer run. This is one way in which a monetary policy that stabilized the nominal exchange rate would be counterproductive. I now turn to the analysis that indicates that the swing in the real exchange rate of the dollar in the 1980s was precisely such an equilibrium reaction.
Fiscal Policy and the Real Exchange Rate
To establish the relationship between real disturbances and equilibrium adjustment of the real exchange rate, in this section I summarize a short-run "fundamentals" model of fiscal policy and the real exchange rate.3 The model is a framework for analysis that integrates goods markets and asset markets to describe simultaneous determination of the interest rate and the exchange rate. It is a short-run model in the sense that the existing stock of assets is taken as given; it is afundamentals model because it focuses on the underlying macroeconomic determinants of movements in rates, about which the market will form expectations. The framework is useful because it makes it possible to distinguish between such external events as shifts in the budget position (the deficit), shifts in international asset demands (the safe haven effect), and changes in tax law or financial regulation on the basis of their differing implications for movements in the interest rate and the exchange rate. I begin with the national income, or flow-of-funds, identity that constrains flows in the economy, then turn to asset-market equilibrium that constrains rates of return, and finally bring the two together in figure 2.
The national income identity is generally written as The relationship between the real interest rate, r, and the real exchange rate, e, that is imposed by financial market equilibrium can be seen by considering the returns that a representative U.S. asset holder obtains on domestic and foreign assets of the same maturity. The return on the domestic asset is i in nominal terms and r = i -P in real terms, where P is the exogenous expected rate of inflation. The nominal foreign interest rate is i*, and the return on the foreign asset is i* -e in nominal terms, where e is the expected rate of change in the exchange rate. In real terms the U.S. asset holder's return would be i* -e -P. In equilibrium, the difference between the two returns must be equal to the Next, the expected rate of change of the exchange rate is related to the actual current rate. If the perceived long-run equilibrium real rate that sets the full-employment current account balance at zero is denoted as e, one reasonable assumption is that the current rate is expected to return gradually toward long-run equilibrium. This assumption can be written as a proportional adjustment mechanism: This condition says that forgiven values of the bond stock, B, inflation, P, the foreign nominal interest rate, i*, and the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, e, an increase in r requires a rise in e to maintain equilibrium in financial markets. Why? If the home interest rate rises, equilibrium can be maintained for a given foreign rate only if the exchange rate is expected to fall. From equation 4, the actual current rate must rise to establish e < 0. In terms of market operations, the rise in domestic interest rates, r, causes sales of foreign assets and exchange rate appreciation until equilibrium is reestablished. This is essentially what happened in 1981 with the announcement of a path of future U.S. deficits. The expected deficit path did not substantially change the long-run e that would balance the current account, but it did move r and e.
The flow equilibrium condition, equation 1, and the rate-of-return condition, equation 5, can be joined to form the short-run framework for simultaneous determination of r and e. Rewriting equation 1 to show the dependence of S and I on r and of X on e gives: ( 
6) G -T= S(r) -(r) -X(e).
For a given level of the full-employment budget, the trade-off between r and e that maintains flow equilibrium is given by the negatively sloped IX curve in figure 2 . For a given G -T, an increase in r, which reduces (S -1), requires a decrease in e, which increases X, to maintain flow equilibrium. An increase in G -T will shift the IX curve up or to the right, requiring some combination of a rise in r and e to maintain flow equilibrium. The rate-of-return condition, equation 5, gives the positively sloped FM curve in figure 2, for given B, i*, P, and e. Its slope is 0, the speedof-adjustment parameter for expectations. An increase in the risk premium, p, due to a rise in the supply of U.S. bonds, B, will shift the FM curve up and to the left, requiring an increase in r for any given value of e.
In the short run, equilibrium r and e are reached at the intersection of IX and FM in figure 2; there, both equilibrium conditions are met. For the purposes of the analysis here, the assumption is that initially e = e, with no expected movement in exchange rates. This is taken to represent the equilibrium around 1980, before the surge in interest rates and the exchange rate in question.
A The significance measure is the probability that the true value of the coefficient is zero, using a two-tailed t test. The coefficient for the time variable is the estimated exponential rate of growth or decline in employment (wages or output) that occurs because of secular changes in taste, comparative advantage, or technology. The coefficients on the real exchange rate, the real price of energy, and the employment ratio can be interpreted as elasticities.
In table A-1, the coefficient of the real exchange rate variable is negative for sixteen of twenty industries and significant at the 0.05 level for eleven industries. Within the nondurable goods industries, textile mill products, apparel and other textile goods, and petroleum and coal products are negative and significant at the 0.05 level. Somewhat less significant but showing important negative effects are chemicals and allied products, rubber and miscellaneous plastic products, and leather and leather goods. The coefficient for the print and publishing industry is significant and positive.
The durable goods sector has seven industries with a negative coefficient for the real exchange rate that is significant at the 0.01 level, including stone, clay, and glass products, primary metal products, fabricated metal products, nonelectrical machinery, transportation equipment, instruments and related products, and miscellaneous manufacturing. Coefficients for lumber and wood products, furniture and fixtures, and electrical and electronic equipment are positive but small and not statistically significant.
The results by state are shown in table A-2, sorted by the size of the exchange rate coefficient. The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level for thirty-five states, and at the 0.05 level for thirty-eight states. The sign is negative for forty-six states, including all in which it is significant at the 0.05 level. The elasticity of employment with respect to the real exchange rate in the "Rust Belt" states runs from -0.45 in Michigan to -0.23 in Pennsylvania. There are four states at the bottom of the list with insignificant positive coefficients. The service-oriented District of Columbia has the only significantly positive coefficient.
